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REVIEW ESSAY
Liberalism and Abortion
ROBIN WEST*
First in a groundbreaking book, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From
Choice to Consent, published in 1996,' then in various public fora, from
academic conference panels to Christian radio call-in shows, 2 and now in a
major law review article entitled My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitu-
tional Right to Abortion Funding,3 Eileen McDonagh has sought to redefine
drastically our understanding of the still deeply contested right to an abortion,
and hence, of the nature of the constitutional protections which in her view this
embattled right deserves. Her argument is complicated and subtle, but its basic
thrust can be readily summarized. A woman's right to an abortion, McDonagh
argues, should be understood as a right to defend herself against the nonconsen-
sual invasion, appropriation, and use of her physical body by an unwelcome
fetus, rather than as a right to choose medical procedures free of interference by
the state.4 We have a right to an abortion not because we have a right to be free
of moralistic state legislation that interferes with our medical choices, but rather
because we have a right to defend ourselves against the nonconsensual, invasive
takings of our bodies, and we have a right to so defend ourselves even if it
requires the use of deadly force against a human life.5 Of course, unlike most
assailants, a fetus unquestionably lacks intentionality and agency. But just as
unquestionably, a fetus uses and appropriates the pregnant woman's body,
occasioning substantial physical changes and dislocations within her, a good
number of which are potentially injurious.6 When the use and appropriation of
her physical body occurs without the woman's consent, that use and appropria-
tion, and the physical changes and dislocations they engender, are harms. Their
occurrence, then, is tantamount to a noncriminal assault, against which a
woman may defend herself just as she would be entitled to defend herself
against such an assault by another human being.7 The woman's right to termi-
nate a nonconsensual pregnancy should be understood as part and parcel of her
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
1. EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996).
2. See, e.g., Robin West et al., Breaking the Abortion Deadlock? Twenty-Five Years After Roe v.
Wade, 12 STUD. Am. POL. DEV. 204 (1998) (recording of panel discussion at 1997 Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, moderated by Sue Davis). For McDonagh's discussion of her
participation on radio talk shows, see id. at 222.
3. 62 ALa. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with author).
4. See MCDONAGH, supra note 1, at 6-7.
5. See id. at 15-17, 93-96.
6. See id. at 84-91.
7. See id.
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paradigmatically liberal right to defend herself against any assaultive appropria-
tion by others of her physical self.
Two implications follow from McDonagh's reframing of the basic right to
terminate a pregnancy, both of which are of great significance to the abortion
debate. First, if the right to an abortion is indeed best understood as a right to
defend oneself against the nonconsensual appropriation and use of one's body
by a fetus, then it no longer matters whether or not the fetus is a "human being"
or a "person"; a woman, no less than a man, has a right to defend herself
against the nonconsensual appropriation and use of her physical body by any
human life, born or unborn, whether or not that person is genetically linked,
whether or not that person is an intentional agent, and whether or not that
person is a fetus, an infant, or an adult. Given McDonagh's premises, the
"personhood" of the fetus is no longer fatal to the right to an abortion; in fact, if
anything, this characteristic clarifies the right's contours.8 Second, so reframed,
the right as defined by McDonagh strongly implies a correlative right to state
funding.9 In liberal societies governed by the rule of law, we typically have not
only a right to defend ourselves against nonconsensual appropriations of our
bodies or body parts, but we also have a firm expectation (whether or not a
right) that the state will assist us in perfecting that defense. The very raison
d'tre of even a bare bones, minimalist, night-watchman state requires as much.
States exist, largely, to ensure that we are protected against precisely such
assaultive invasions. To whatever degree the state protects individuals against
invasive assaults by others, the state must provide comparable protection for
those suffering nonconsensual pregnancies. The only way it can do so, realisti-
cally, is by funding abortions.
Both implications of McDonagh's argument-that the right is not dependent
upon the nonpersonhood of the fetus, and that it seemingly implies at least a
moral and political (and possibly a legal and constitutional) right to state
funding for abortions-distinguish it from the "argument from choice" that
dominates the pro-choice movement, pro-choice rhetoric, and to a lesser extent
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence. Thus, it is widely assumed, and in fact
was conceded in oral argument in Roe v. Wade' itself, that the right to an
abortion-understood as the right to choose an abortion free of state interfer-
ence-would have to give way to the fetus's right to life, if the fetus were to be
understood as a person." McDonagh takes no position on whether this conces-
sion is warranted, but argues instead that if we understand the right to an
abortion as a right to defend oneself against nonconsensual, invasive takings of
one's body by others, the right is strengthened rather than weakened by the
assumption that the fetus is a person; again, no born person would have the right
8. See id. at 10-11.
9. See id. at 8-9, 10-11, 107-24, 139-42; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 68-73 (manuscript).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Seeid. at 164-65.
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to appropriate the body of another toward the end of the assailant's own
survival, and this is true, as noted above, whether or not the aggressor was
genetically linked to the victim and whether or not the aggressor was an
intentional agent.' 2 Similarly, the argument for abortion from "choice" has
been unsuccessful in sustaining the claim that the right to an abortion embraces
the right to state funding. Congress has explicitly refused to fund poor women's
abortions, 13 and the Court has explicitly upheld its power to do so.14 Again,
McDonagh takes no position one way or the other on the correctness of the
Court's decision. Rather, she argues, were the right to an abortion understood as
originating in our right to defend ourselves against nonconsensual, assaultive
invasions of our bodies, the right to funding would logically, legally, and
perhaps constitutionally follow; the right to an abortion, so understood, is a part
of our right to be protected by the state against private violence, rather than our
right to make private medical decisions free from state interferences. To what-
ever degree the state protects us against similar private aggressions by born
persons (or other assaultive entities), the state must then protect us in this realm
as well. 1
5
For both reasons, McDonagh's argument, if successful, is not only provoca-
tive but practically and politically important. If it is a good argument, it should
be embraced and propounded by both the political and legal wings of the
pro-choice movement. It gives an argument for abortion rights that implies the
right to funding which is strengthened rather than weakened by the increasingly
apparent humanity of the fetus, and it does so through the traditional legal
method of analogizing pregnancy and fetal life to lived experiences and circum-
stances which, if not exactly common, are at least potentially available to all of
us. It ought to embolden and empower the embattled abortion rights movement,
even while it occasions a rethinking of the legal and moral assumptions that to
date have overdetermined the logic of that movement's central arguments. It
proffers a stark and fecund constitutional argument for reproductive freedom
that builds on and accepts, but also transforms as it deepens, existing privacy
jurisprudence. It is a liberal and individualistic argument, respectful of the
institutions as well as the moral precommitments of liberal legal jurisprudence.
It could conceivably find its way into the Court's reasoning over the next few
years. If that were to come to pass, it would be a momentous step forward for
women's equality, and for the autonomy of women and men both, in relation to
their reproductive lives. Needless to say, by strengthening women's equality and
autonomy, it might thereby improve not only women's civic and economic life
but the quality and justice of family life as well.
I have commented elsewhere, however, on the substantial contribution I think
12. See MCDONAGH, supra note 1, at 9, 138.
13. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109,93 Stat. 926 (1980).
14. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
15. See McDONAGH, supra note 1, at 142.
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this book makes to the abortion debates.' 6 In this review essay, I want to show
that the importance of this extraordinary book is not limited to the unquestion-
ably novel argument it puts forward for abortion funding, or to any other short-
or long-term contribution to the abortion wars. I want to suggest instead that the
book reaches well beyond abortion politics, and that it makes an original and
much needed contribution to liberal theory, and hence to liberal feminism. The
uniqueness and importance of McDonagh's argument is that it takes very
seriously the liberatory and egalitarian promises of both Kantian liberalism and
the rule of law in liberal societies, and it takes very seriously the possibility of
extending those liberatory and egalitarian promises to citizens who happen to be
women, and to those women who happen to be pregnant. If what it means to be
human is, importantly, to be free, and what it means to be free is to have the
power to will oneself, through giving or withholding consent, to those institu-
tions, or obligations, or others, or conditions, that later become defining, then
women must be given the right to consent or not consent to those institutions,
obligations, others, and conditions that define and confine us. Justice, in short,
requires as much. Pregnancy, McDonagh is arguing, is not only a "natural
condition," it is also precisely such an institution, obligation, and condition-
and the fetus is one such "other"- that triggers this liberal demand of justice,
and hence of a woman's consent. For pregnancy in a liberal society to constitute
a just condition, it must be a relation between a woman and a fetus to which the
woman has given her full and voluntary consent.
A good part of contemporary liberalism, as well as a good part of modem
feminism-from John S. Mill's work on marriage 17 to Catharine MacKinnon's
work on sex18-has been committed to the task of extending to women what is
in essence the promise at the heart of liberalism: if we render those social and
legal institutions that define, constrain, or enrich our lives consensual, they will
facilitate, rather than restrict our freedom, and that will in turn deepen our
societal commitment to justice. For that to happen, however, the institutions
themselves must be radically transformed. Thus, for women to be equal and
free, Mill argued, they must be equal and free in their marriages; for that to
happen the institution of marriage must be transformed, from its legal superstruc-
ture to the defining psychology of its participants. For women to be equal and
free, MacKinnon has argued in this century, they must be equal and free in their
sexual lives; for that to happen our sexual institutions must be transformed,
from their legal superstructure to their defining psychology. McDonagh's work
is squarely in that liberal and liberal feminist tradition, and it is no overstate-
ment to say that it is of comparable importance to both Mill's and MacKinnon's
work. For women to be equal and free, McDonagh is arguing, they must be
16. See Robin West et al., supra note 2, at 205-11.
17. See John S. Mill, On Marriage, in ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION 35 (John M.
Robson ed., Routledge & K. Paul 1984) (1833); John S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON
EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION, supra, at 259 (1869).
18. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
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equal and free in their reproductive lives. For that to happen the institution of
pregnancy must be transformed, again from its legal superstructure to its
defining psychology. Without her consent, a woman's pregnancy works an
injustice upon her. Until that is clearly recognized and rectified, women's lives,
particularly their reproductive lives, will remain an anomaly in a liberal polity.
There are other commonalities between McDonagh's current project, and
Mill's and MacKinnon's work on marriage and sex respectively. The arguments
put forward by the three have striking structural similarities. All three social
critics have argued the moral necessity of women's consent to the justice of a
defining institution, have then highlighted the present lack of it, have empha-
sized that the lack of a woman's consent implies an act of violence upon her,
which had theretofore been unrecognized or unacknowledged but which carries
substantial psychic and physical harms, and then have tried to hold that violence
and the unacknowledged and uncompensated harm it causes to the critical light
of the demands of justice. In all three cases, furthermore, the responses by
critics to these arguments have been much the same. In all three cases the
argument that some important institution, convention, or condition that defines
or colors women's lives can only be morally justified if it is consensual, has
been met first with the claim that the institution, convention, or condition so
targeted-patriarchal marriage, sex, pregnancy-is a natural condition, or at any
rate impervious to change, and then with the claim that the alleged harms the
institution purportedly visits upon women are in any event trivial or nonexist-
ent.' 9 Accordingly, in all three cases, the argument for liberal reform has been
dependent upon both a clear showing that the institution in question is noncon-
sensual, harmful, and changeable, and a resolute insistence that liberalism
demands that the state take the harm seriously. Eileen McDonagh is the next on
a short but impressive list of political writers to show in detail the liberatory and
radical consequences of taking liberalism seriously and applying it in an
evenhanded and rigorous fashion to the conditions of women's lives. Mc-
Donagh's book, in short, deepens our appreciation of liberalism and its promise,
just as it deepens our understanding of the work that needs to be done to secure
its fruits.
In the four sections of this essay, then, I want to examine the book as an
exemplary model of and contribution to liberal, liberal legalist, and liberal
feminist theory, arguing in each section that the book (and the article) exemplify
not only the strengths of liberalism, feminism, and liberal feminist reasoning in
law, but also their limitations. Let me be clear, however, at the outset, that I
want to explore the quality, strengths, and limits of liberal legalism that I think
this book exposes so as to strengthen, not discredit, its central argument
regarding abortion rights. I basically agree with Eileen McDonagh that the
19. For a contemporary example, see Richard A. Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist Thought, 18
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331 (1995) (asserting that differential treatment is the result of biological
evolution and therefore natural).
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general argument for protecting women's reproductive integrity that she has
spelt out in this book is superior to the privacy, equality, or due process-liberty
arguments the Court and the pro-choice movement have employed to date. By
examining the ways in which that argument is served, and some of the ways it
may be disserved, by its fundamental liberal assumptions, we may strengthen
both her basic argument and the liberal theory that animates it.
I. LIBERALISM, FORMAL EQUALITY, AND ANALOGICAL REASONING
McDonagh's basic argument is captured without too much slippage in a few
basic analogies, the first of which appears in the affirmative presentation of the
argument in her book, and the remainder in her responses to objections, and
some of which are elaborated more carefully in her forthcoming law review
article. The first analogy I've already noted. A nonconsensual pregnancy, Mc-
Donagh argues, is basically analogous to an assault by a born person in need of
body parts, an assault against which one clearly has both the right to defend
oneself and a legitimate expectation that the state will assist in that self defense.
We surely have such a right of self-defense, even as against a genetically-linked
born child. For example, if a grown child of "Justice John Doe" were to find
himself or herself in need of one of Justice Doe's kidneys, Justice Doe would
clearly have the right either to consent or not to consent to the donation of that
kidney, even to his own child and regardless of the fact that Justice Doe was
responsible for bringing that child into the world in the first place.20 Further-
more, if Justice Doe refused to consent to the donation of his kidney and his
grown child attempted to appropriate the kidney by force, Justice Doe would
have a legitimate expectation, and perhaps a right, that the state would assist
him in resisting his child's assault. The position of the woman pregnant without
her consent, McDonagh argues, is basically analogous to the position of the
woman or man assaulted by a grown child in need of one of their body parts. If
the intercourse was voluntary, she may be partly responsible for having brought
the fetus into existence. But likewise, the parent of the grown (or at any rate the
bom) child is also partly responsible for having brought that child into exis-
tence. In either case, the partial responsibility of the parent for the child's
existence does not imply the child's right to appropriate the parent's body
against the parent's will. Thus, if the pregnant woman refuses to consent to the
fetus's appropriation and use of her body, then that appropriation and use is a
(noncriminal) assault and a harm, against which she has the right to defend
herself. Like Justice Doe, she can defend herself against that assault even with
lethal force, if required, and like Justice Doe she has a legitimate expectation,
and possibly a right, that the state will come to her assistance in achieving that
end. 2'
The second analogy central to McDonagh's argument appears as a response
20. See McDONAGH, supra note 1, at 138-39.
21. See id. at 142.
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to two separate (but related) anticipated objections. The two objections are
straightforward. The first I've already noted: the fetus lacks agency. We are not
justified in using lethal force, the objector might argue, against an agent who is
in no way responsible for the harm that agent is occasioning, even if we are
justified in using lethal force against an intentional wrongdoer. Not so, Mc-
Donagh argues; we are justified in defending ourselves against unintentional or
nonculpable assailants no less than intentional wrongdoers. We are, for ex-
ample, justified in defending ourselves against wildlife, even if that wildlife is
federally protected, and even if fully innocent, and even if our own negligent
acts wound us up in our sorry predicament; we can kill a grizzly bear rather than
acquiesce in her desire to eat us. We are justified in defending ourselves against
the criminally insane (and hence "not culpable" attackers). We are justified in
defending ourselves against natural disasters. Grizzlies, the criminally insane,
and natural disasters all lack agency, but this does not diminish the force of our
right to defend ourselves against them. 2 Likewise, the fetus's lack of agency
does not imply that our right to defend ourselves against it is diminished.
The second objection is somewhat more complicated, but (in my view)
potentially more damaging; if we consent to the risk of pregnancy when
engaging in consensual intercourse, haven't we thereby consented to the preg-
nancy itself? McDonagh thinks not and again resorts to analogies (some of the
same analogies as above). We are sometimes morally and even legally respon-
sible, McDonagh concedes, for those conditions or events the risk of which we
essentially gave rise to by our own actions, particularly if the action was
negligent or reckless. If we slip on a wet floor, we are at least partly responsible
for the resulting injury if we created the mess in the first place and for some
reason neglected to clean it up. Nevertheless, McDonagh argues, in my view
correctly, it does not follow that we consent to the injury even if it's true that
our actions negligently increased the risk of the injury's occurrence. Thus, we
don't consent to the presence of the cancer in our lungs even if we increased the
risk of its occurrence by smoking cigarettes. We don't consent to the devastation
a hurricane does to our residence even if built in a high risk area. We don't
consent to the grizzly bear's consumption of us even if we negligently entered
the wrong area of the forest. We don't have to permit the cancer to thrive within
us or acquiesce in the harm done to our property or allow the grizzly to eat us;
we can expel the cancer to the best of our ability and repair the damage done to
our home, we can and do defend ourselves, with lethal force if necessary,
against grizzly bears. Consent to a risk of harm, she concludes, does not imply
consent to its occurrence. 3
I don't want to examine here the merits of these arguments. Some objections
are relatively obvious, and a number of them are catalogued and convincingly
22. See id. at 34-36; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 46, 50-51 (manuscript).
23. See MCDONAGH, supra note 1, at 43-44, 66, 141-42; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 40-43
(manuscript).
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responded to in My Body, My Consent. I want to look instead at the reliance on
analogy-a reliance at least as crucial to McDonagh as it was twenty years ago
to Judith Thompson's famous and similar, but more limited, liberal argument for
abortion rights, which turned on the similarity of the pregnant woman's di-
lemma to that of a person involuntarily hooked up to a famous and medically
needy violinist, against her will, and for nine months of her life.24 The heavy
reliance on analogical reasoning at the heart of McDonagh's case-the fetus
analogized to a born person assaulting a parent toward the end of procuring
necessary body parts, to a natural disaster, to a grizzly bear, to a criminally
insane assaulter, and to a disease-is, perhaps, the most brilliant and memorable
feature of McDonagh's argument, even if, for many readers and critics, it is the
most off-putting. What I want to stress here is that whether we view those
analogies, and the methodological reliance upon them, as brilliant or unfortu-
nate, that reliance itself is a direct consequence of the liberalism and, more
specifically, of the liberal legalism that animates the entire vision.
A liberal society requires that our universality be acknowledged and re-
spected-we share universal traits that demand respect-and the rule of law in a
liberal society demands that like cases be decided alike. Equality and liberty
both, from a liberal perspective, are dependent upon the recognition and the
equal treatment accorded our universality. It is imperative, therefore, in a liberal
society, that pregnant women be treated equally to nonpregnant persons. Preg-
nant women share in the universal traits that in turn demand equal respect and
dignity, and it is the heart of liberalism to bestow that equal respect, dignity, and
treatment, and in spite of their manifest distinguishing characteristic: pregnant
women and only pregnant women are physically and biologically attached, or
connected, to other human life. And it is imperative from a liberal legal
perspective that the state, through its laws, treat pregnant women similarly to
other persons similarly situated-like cases must be treated alike. The core
conviction of liberal legalism is surely that our universally shared human
essence requires this equal treatment; law must treat us equally, because of the
profoundly important ways in which we are alike. To do otherwise is chauvinist,
nationalist, racist, alienating, subordinating, discriminating and, from a liberal
perspective, illegal to boot. Liberalism requires a communal and state recogni-
tion of our shared universal nature, and liberal legalism requires a rule of law
that accordingly treats likes alike.
Thus, the overpowering need for analogical thinking. The heart of the liberal
impulse is to recognize and acknowledge the universality of the human condi-
tion, and Eileen McDonagh, to her great credit, expresses that heart better than
any current liberal theorist. The pregnant woman who does not consent to her
pregnancy, she points out, is not unlike others suffering nonconsensual assaults,
and it is that similarity we must emphasize and respond to if we are to treat her
24. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK (William
Parent ed., 1986).
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justly. By examining and responding to the similarities, we can best appreciate
the demands of justice. If others similarly situated are permitted the right of
self-defense, then so must she be as well. If others legitimately expect the
protective assistance of the state When so doing, then her expectation must be
honored as well. To do less-to treat her dissimilarly when she is in fact
similarly situated-is to in effect throw her out of the legal community, or,
alternatively, to allow her to remain but only at the price of her exploitation. It is
to use her rather than to equally regard her. Equal regard-the heart of liberal-
ism-requires that pregnant women be treated similarly to those with whom
they are similarly situated. The imperative of equal treatment at the heart of
liberal legalism animates the need to locate those to whom she is similarly
situated and, therefore, the search for analagous conditions.
This is why the ethical and even emotional heart of McDonagh's argument
lies squarely in its driving analogy. If a man (or a woman) were to be attacked
by a born child intent on appropriating some needed body part against the man's
will, the man would be allowed to ward off the attack, and could expect the
state to assist him in doing so. Why should the pregnant woman be treated or
viewed any differently? If we do treat and view her differently, might it be
because we have become so thoroughly accustomed to viewing and treating
pregnant women as the natural nurturers of human life, and their bodies as the
natural vehicles for that function, that we are comfortable regarding her will,
her consent or lack of it, her drives, interests, and subjectivities that may be
contrary to that end, as simply beside the point? If we insist on the utter
differentness of the nonconsensually pregnant woman from the attacked man,
might it be because we have for two millennia viewed women, but not men, as
the creatures who distinctively contribute their earthly bodies to the cause of
human survival, and do so without their "consent," their will, or their desire to
do so, ever really being a serious issue? If we view women as distinctively
different in this way, might it be because we view them as basically will-less, as
creatures who distinctively, even by definition, nurture because their nature
compels it, rather than because they have decided to do so? If we view women
as distinctively different in this way, then, isn't it because we view them as
creatures for whom liberalism cannot possibly have been forged, and as crea-
tures whom a liberal state cannot possibly protect from nonconsensual assaults,
and particularly from invasive, nonconsensual assaults, on their bodies?
Eileen McDonagh's analogies force these questions. If we are going to honor
the universal in the human being, and if we identify the universal as, in part, the
capacity to freely will our most significant actions, including above all else the
act of supporting other human life, and if we are going to include pregnant
women in that class of people capable of moral freedom, then we are going to
have to acknowledge that the category of nonconsensual assaults that infringe
the rights of persons includes the category of nonconsensual pregnancies. That
in turn might force us to see all pregnancies, consensual and nonconsensual, in a
new light. We might come to see pregnancy as an act, rather than a condition,
21251999]
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that in turn follows upon a decision to contribute one's physical body to a new
life. If so, then like all such acts it has moral meaning when it is the result of a
willed decision to do so. To view a nonconsensual pregnancy in this way-as an
assault-and to view a pregnancy in this way-as the act that follows the
decision to assist another human life to come into being-is concededly an
awkward and unfamiliar accommodation. We are no more accustomed to
thinking of nonconsensual pregnancies as assaults than we are accustomed to
thinking of consensual pregnancies as actions following upon willed and free
decisions. But it is an awkwardness and discomfort and unfamiliarity that
should feel, by now, familiar. It is the awkwardness and discomfort and
unfamiliarity that has accompanied every liberal advance in including within
the scope of the human community that which had been previously excluded,
and then treating and respecting it accordingly.
That very reliance on analogy, however, also reveals the limits of Mc-
Donagh's argument, which may in turn suggest a limit to the power of liberal
legalism, at least in the area of abortion rights. Of course, a fetus is not a born
person, nor is it a hurricane, or a cancer, or a grizzly bear, and while being
invaded and attacked by an unwanted fetus might be similar in some ways or
for some purposes to being attacked by a born person (with or without agency),
or a grizzly bear, or a cancer, it is not identical. Analogies highlight the
differences as well as the similarities of whatever is being analogized, and that
is certainly the case here as well. Thus, there are differences between fetuses on
the one hand and born humans, grizzly bears, and natural disasters on the other
to which the analogies, rather dramatically, direct our attention. Of course, not
all differences matter. But here there are, I think, at least three such differences
that might be salient.
First, an attack by a born person, to begin with the narrowly political,
threatens the peace-and hence threatens the state-in a way that the invasion of
a woman by an unwanted fetus does not. Perhaps this is not a difference that
ought to matter to a liberal state, which perhaps ought to care more about
protecting rights than its own security, but, nevertheless, it may well be at least
one reason the individual is given so much greater protection against the overt
violence done by a born person than against the covert violence done by a fetus,
even in a liberal regime. A sovereign-any sovereign, including a liberal
sovereign-has a much greater stake in deterring or in some way suppressing
overt, visible, born-person-on-born-person violence than in deterring or in some
way suppressing fetal-maternal conflicts. To put the point crudely, the sovereign-
even the liberal sovereign-has not conferred rights in the latter situation in
part, perhaps, simply because it (unlike its subjects) has no need or interest in
doing so. Subordination of the woman to the fetus's needs, even if that
subordination constitutes an invasion and appropriation of her body, can happily
coexist with a regime that accords legal equality of born citizens by enforcing a
peace among and between them.
The second difference goes to the nature of the harm. Even acknowledging
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the profound alterations of a woman's physical body occasioned by a normal
pregnancy, that pregnancy, even when nonconsensual, does not typically threaten
death, lasting bodily injury, or even an immediate disruption of the woman's life
plans and projects the way a violent assault by a born person most often does.
Women who are undergoing nonconsensual pregnancies are typically not in fear
of their lives; they don't worry that the fetus will kill them, and for a good part
of their pregnancy they can go about their normal life routines. The fear of
death or serious bodily injury which is such a great part of the harm occasioned
by assaults by born persons is not such a salient part of the assault occasioned
by most-certainly not all-nonconsensual pregnancies. This is not to underplay
the very real physical changes wrought by all pregnancies: wanted, unwanted,
consensual, and nonconsensual. But those changes are, simply, different from
the changes we typically associate with violent assault. And the differences, by
definition, are going to have to be addressed in some way other than the
analogical.
McDonagh recognizes this point, and her response, although partial, is an
important one. A nonconsensual pregnancy, McDonagh argues, can be analo-
gized to assaults, particularly for purposes of clarifying our moral, legal, and
political intuitions; nevertheless, the physical harm brought on by a nonconsen-
sual pregnancy is misunderstood, underappreciated, and, for the most part, sui
generis. To underscore and make real that physical harm, McDonagh abandons
analogy and relies instead on an elaborate and detailed description of the
physical effects, particularly but not only the debilitating physical effects, of
both normal and risky pregnancies.25 This utterly nonanalogical and lengthy
description of exactly what it is that a fetus does to a woman's body is one of
McDonagh's most important contributions to the literature. It is the best descrip-
tion I know of, outside of a medical textbook, of the effects of pregnancy on a
normal adult female body. There is, I think, no way to read it in good faith and
not concede at least the plausibility of her basic point: if even a small number of
these profound physical effects-the four-hundred-fold increase of some hor-
mones, for example, that a pregnancy prompts in a woman's body-were to be
wrought upon a victim's body, without consent and by a born assailant toward
the end of the assailant's physical survival, no matter how innocent and needy
the assailant, those effects would be immediately and noncontroversially recog-
nized as a harm, and a harm against which the victim has a right of self-defense.
Nevertheless, in my view McDonagh doesn't go far enough toward the end of
simply accounting, descriptively, for the differences in the nature of the harm
occasioned by nonconsensual pregnancies and the harm occasioned by garden
variety assaults. This may be, in part, because her deeply liberal convictions
repel her from difference and draw her instead to emphasize the commonalities
shared by assaultive nonconsensual pregnancies and other sorts of experiences.
The heavy reliance on the physical harms of pregnancy, although driven by the
25. See McDONAGH, supra note 1, at 69-78.
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laudable liberal urge to identify the common ground between ordinary injuries
and pregnancies, risks missing entirely the psychic harms such pregnancies
occasion. Those psychic harms may be not only sui generis, but impossible to
describe in either analogical or medical terms. If so, they are going to be
precisely what is missed in a rigorously liberal attempt to capture the harmful-
ness of nonconsensual pregnancy. But they may also be what definitively
characterizes the changes of a pregnancy, when nonconsensual, as harmful.
I have written at length elsewhere on what those psychic harms may be,2 6 so I
will only briefly recapitulate them here. They are not at all at odds with or even
discontinuous with the essential thrust of McDonagh's argument. Subjectively,
or experientially, the central point is just this: the nonconsensual pregnancy,
unlike the nonconsensual assault, threatens not so much to end your life "from
the outside," so to speak, but to "take over" your life from the inside. The fear
is not that my life will end but that my control over its course will end. A more
objective way to characterize the injury, and in terms that might be more
continuous with McDonagh's, is that it so flagrantly precludes the possibility of
the woman becoming or experiencing herself as a free and moral person-as
that person is understood, paradigmatically, by liberalism itself.
A free moral person, it has been the central lesson of liberalism to convey, is
someone who freely decides to undertake moral action. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the woman who has no choice but to remain pregnant against
her will is, from a liberal perspective, something considerably less than human.
In some sense she is engaging in moral action-she is sacrificing her own body
for the well-being of another. But she is doing it unwillingly, without her
consent, and without any decision on her part to do so. Her moral being is more
like the morality of the chestnut tree that provides shade than it is like the moral
being of the civic volunteer giving time and effort and resources in the commu-
nity. Her moral essence is passive and will-less, when nonconsensual, and this
passive, will-less moral role is imposed upon her by a community and a state
that are unwilling to act on her behalf to prevent it. If she keeps the baby she
eventually bears, of course, she will continue to live out this antiliberal moral
mode for a good part of her adult life. Her moral essence is so increasingly and
cumulatively premised upon her will-lessness and nonconsensuality, that she
can eventually become thoroughly alienated and differentiated from the rich,
hopeful, and promising conception of moral action-the freely willed moral
deed-defined by liberalism as the essence of human freedom. The woman who
is pregnant against her will embodies nonfreedom, because she embodies the
very act-unwilled sacrifice of one's body for the life of others-that is free-
dom's antithesis.
The last difference goes to the other side of the balance. McDonagh's liberal
insistence on the analogical similarity between the nonconsensually pregnant
woman and the assaulted victim misses the substantial payoff of a pregnancy:
26. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997).
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the four-hundred-fold hormonal increase on a nonpregnant person doesn't result
in something as wondrous and as innocent (in the eyes of some) as a healthy
human baby. If we combine this difference with the first two-the fetus's use of
the woman's body does not threaten the peace and only rarely rather than
typically threatens death or lasting bodily injury-it looks much less clear that
the liberal balance between the woman's bodily integrity and freedom on the
one hand, and fetal and newborn life on the other, ought to be struck in the same
way as the balance between the assailee's bodily integrity and freedom on the
one hand, and the born person's survival chances with the withheld kidney on
the other. The response to the objection that it ought not be, I think, might
surely be informed by analogies. It is, though, in my view, an undue reliance on
and deference to liberal legalism to think that that response can be limited to the
realm of analogy, hypothetical, and thought experiment, for the simple reason
that there is just nothing quite like the pregnant woman's relation to the fetus,
whether consensual or not. Striking the correct balance, from a liberal perspec-
tive, between the constraints on women's freedom and the invasion of their
bodily integrity occasioned by nonconsensual pregnancies and the value of the
lives those pregnancies nurture, requires us to look away from thought experi-
ment and to the world: to the effects, in a liberal but still patriarchal society, of
withholding this freedom from women; to the quality of the judgments women
make when granted the power of decision; to the consequences of conferring
that power, alternatively, on husbands and fathers, on the state, on courts, on
legislatures, or on doctors. In my view, women, their children, their families,
and liberal society generally are all best served by conferring the power of
consent, nonconsent, and choice on pregnant women themselves, and given that
assumption, the strength of the case for protecting women from the harms of
nonconsensual pregnancies through a liberal right to be free of such burdens is
quite clear. But the argument for this conclusion comes at least partly from
experience in the social, lived-in world; it cannot come solely from the nature of
fetal life, the logic of rights, and analogies and hypothetical forms of arguments
we can then use to understand their contours.
I will comment much more briefly on the problems that plague the particular
analogies and the methodological use of analogies McDonagh employs to
respond to the two objections recited above. To the first objection-that fetuses
lack agency-McDonagh is right to point out that cancers, grizzly bears, and
insane assailants also lack agency, yet we routinely characterize their effects as
harmful, and feel fully justified in expelling them from our body, if we are
capable of doing so. But the analogies raise problems-perhaps, here, more than
they solve. Simply put, the more closely we identify (or analogize) the fetus to
natural phenomenon that lack agency, or events the harm of which we are
entitled to defend against, even if we've partly assumed the risk of their
occurrence-such as grizzlies, hurricanes, or even cancers-the greater the cost
done to the claim that we have a legitimate expectation, and possibly a right, to
state protection against the harms occasioned. That is, even if we have a right to
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state protection against private violence, it seems to be one that is limited to
state protection against harms done by human beings, even if not to those
human beings who are also intentional agents. We may have a right to defend
ourselves against the cancer that invades our body, but it is by no means clear in
this culture that we have a right to the state aiding us in our attempt to do so,
and likewise the grizzly and the hurricane. The stark argument, in other words,
that we must have a right to state funding of abortion to whatever degree we
have a right to state protection against violence, is strengthened by whatever
intuitive appeal attaches to the proffered analogy between the fetus and a human
assailant, but it is weakened, and dramatically so, where the fetus is analogized
to increasingly natural phenomena.
McDonagh is careful not to mix metaphors or analogies, and there's no
logical difficulty in analogizing the fetus to one sort of thing for one purpose
and another sort of thing for another. But nevertheless, at some point the
multiplicity of analogies start to work against each other. The fetus, in other
words, is analogized to a born person for purposes of making out the original
right of self-defense, to a natural phenomenon to highlight the irrelevance of the
arguable assumption of risk involved in the original act of intercourse to the
right of self-defense, and then, finally, to a criminally insane assailant to
illustrate the irrelevance of the fetus's lack of agency to the woman's right to
state assistance. But this comes to seem somewhat arbitrary-if we mix up the
analogies, we get different results. If the fetus is "most like" a grizzly or a
cancer, the woman may have a right to resist it, but she surely has no right to
state assistance in doing so.
And finally, there are also problems with McDonagh's analogical response to
the following objection: that a woman who is pregnant against her will, but as a
result of voluntary intercourse, has implicitly consented to the pregnancy
because she at an earlier time (when engaging in intercourse) voluntarily
assumed the risk of conception. Again, McDonagh's response is that a woman
who consents to intercourse does not necessarily consent to the pregnancy; by
analogy, if we engage in risky behaviors we may have consented to an increased
risk of disease, but it doesn't follow that we've consented to the disease, in the
important sense of having no right to attempt to expel it. For McDonagh, this is
an important, even central and defining issue; she does not intend her argument
to extend only to pregnancies that result from rape or from non-negligent
contraception failure. But is it really the case that consent to the risk of
pregnancy does not entail consent to the pregnancy? Analogies can be piled on,
and on either side. In contract law, clearly, consent to an assumed risk does
imply consent to the risked event; if it didn't, no contract would be secure. If we
analogize a voluntary agreement to have intercourse to a voluntarily entered
contract, the risked event, pregnancy, does look consensual if the agreement to
assume its risk was consensual. In criminal contexts, by contrast, McDonagh's
argument looks sound; consent to a risked criminal event does not by any means
imply consent to the crime-walking through a dangerous neighborhood, it's
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clichrd but true, does not trigger your consent to the redistribution of your cash
and jewelry to muggers. In tort, the situation is complicated and conflicted;
consent to a risk might or might not constitute assumption of the risk, and hence
consent to the risked event.
My point here is not to settle these warring intuitions, but rather to suggest
that the analogical method so central to liberal legal reasoning, and so central to
the logic of this book, is not going to resolve them-for reasons, again, which
might tell us something about the limits of liberal legalism at least as important
as what it tells us about the logic of abortion rights. A fetus is not a cancer, an
insane assailant, or a grizzly bear; intercourse is not a wet floor, and an
agreement to have intercourse is not (typically) a binding contract with contrac-
tually assumed risks. If we think that (or decide that) consent to intercourse
doesn't entail consent to the risked pregnancy, it can't simply be because one or
the other of these analogies is "correct." It must also be because of our
understanding of intercourse and our understanding of pregnancies. Thus, if we
think, as I do, that intercourse is often less informed and voluntary than a
perusal of rape statistics might suggest, and that nonconsensual pregnancies are
far more harmful than is commonly understood, we will be much less inclined
to think that what is perceived to be consensual intercourse, and what is
perceived to be full knowledge of the risk of pregnancy, constitutes consent to
pregnancy. If we think that intercourse is uncomplicated when consensual, and
that even a nonconsensual pregnancy is relatively harmless when normal, we
will be more inclined to think that consensual intercourse constitutes consent to
pregnancy. Neither liberalism, nor analogous reasoning, I am afraid, are going
to further us down the path of resolving these questions. Rich descriptions of
the largely unrecognized and misunderstood harms of nonconsensual pregnan-
cies-which McDonagh has gone a long way toward providing-and rich
accounts of the ambiguities of the voluntariness of intercourse-which she only
brackets, rather than highlights-however, might.
II. LIBERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
American liberal legal theory, distinctively, embraces existing American
constitutional law, doctrine, institutions, and practices, viewing constitutional-
ism as no less constitutive of liberalism than liberalism is of constitutionalism.
To put the same point another way, American liberal legalists, perhaps uniquely,
are committed not only to the rule of law as understood by liberal theory, but
also to the rule of law as adjudicated by American Supreme Court Justices
under the United States Constitution through the vehicle of judicial review. As a
consequence, they are committed to the decidedly odd equation of liberal
political theory with adjudicated constitutional law doctrine; they read liberal-
ism through the gauze of constitutional doctrine, and constitutional doctrine
through the lens of liberal theory.2 7 Sometimes, the overall effect of this near
27. The secondary literature on this phenomenon is enormous. Perhaps the best example of a
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instinctual equation is to liberalize, and dramatically, existing American constitu-
tional doctrine. Constitutional law, when interpreted so as to accord with liberal
justice, is a somewhat different creature-and an obviously more liberal one-
than constitutional law interpreted according to some other political theory, or
according to no political theory at all. At other times, however, and particularly
when the constitutional law or doctrine in question is unequivocally non- or
antiliberal at its core, the effect of the synthesis is to dilute the power of liberal
critique, rather than to ennoble, enlarge, and constitutionalize the reach of
liberalism. McDonagh's constitutional argument, briefly stated above-that
women have not only a right to defend themselves against nonconsensual
pregnancies but a constitutional right to state funding to assist them in doing
so-shares in this conundrum. Her attempt to reconstruct not only the moral and
political basis of abortion rights, but also the legal argument for their constitu-
tional protection along lines true to liberalism and constitutional doctrine both,
runs the risk of diluting liberal critique without substantially increasing the
chance of liberalizing and strengthening constitutional law. Let me first explain
her doctrinal conflict and then return to the liberal constitutionalist's general
dilemma, of which McDonagh's argument is an instance.
Both in her book and now more pointedly in her article, McDonagh makes
clear that she wants to argue that a pregnant woman has not only a moral and
political right, grounded in liberalism, to expect the state to protect her against
nonconsensual pregnancies, but a constitutional right to that protection as
well-and hence that the congressional refusal to fund abortions for poor
women is flatly unconstitutional.2 8 I agree with her that the refusal to fund these
procedures ought to be regarded as unconstitutional, and I agree that under one
possible reading of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments it is unconstitutional.
But McDonagh wants to go one step further. She wants to urge that the
unconstitutionality of that refusal is clear from Supreme Court precedent on the
subject, from Roe v. Wade,29 to Planned Parenthood v. Casey,30 to Deshaney v.
Winnebago.3 ' It's only the Court's failure, to date, to fully appreciate the
implications of what it has already decided that has precluded it from seeing as
much. On that doctrinal point I think she is simply wrong, although I under-
stand and admire her adamant insistence to the contrary.
Of course, McDonagh recognizes, and insists, that if her reconceptualization
of the basic right to abortion were to take hold on the Court, the Hyde
Amendment,32 as well as much else regarding abortion funding, would have to
conscious attempt to integrate liberalism and constitutionalism is Ronald Dworkin's early refutation of
positivism, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). An early critical attack on the entire phenomenon
addressed in the text that has well sustained the test of time is MARK V. TuSHNET, RED WHITE AND
BLUE: A CRITIcAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). 1 criticize the general trend in Robin
West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1992).
28. See MCDONAGH, supra note 1, at 107-54; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 68-93 (manuscript).
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
32. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1980).
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be re-thought.3 3 What she wants very much to deny, though, is that there is a
deeper inconsistency between her own liberal vision of the state, and the vision
of the state currently embedded in much of American constitutional law. If
liberalism is embedded in constitutional law as she claims it is, and if liberalism
requires state funding of abortions as she claims it does, then the abortion
funding cases (as well as the congressional acts themselves) are simply mis-
takes, and remediable mistakes at that. It is obviously another story entirely,
though, if the inconsistency runs deeper.
And, although I know she disagrees, there is a deeper inconsistency, which is
hard to conceal and which goes directly to her conception of the purpose of law
itself. At the heart of McDonagh's political and constitutional argument is the
liberal claim that states must protect individuals against private violent assault.
That is, after all, what states are for, at least as understood in the liberal
tradition, from John Locke and Thomas Hobbes through to Robert Nozick and
John Rawls. Whatever else states may or may not do, they exist to make life
less brutish and nasty and a little longer by prohibiting acts of private violence-
and hence subordination-among citizens. The Constitution, read through the
interpretive gauze of liberalism, must surely then require as much; citizens do,
after all, have a constitutional right to equal protection of the law. What that
clause simply has to mean, McDonagh concludes, conceptually and literally, is
that citizens have a right to equal protection of the law against private assaults.
The problem is that the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the individual
does not have such a right. As the Court put it in Deshaney, there are not only
no positive rights in the Constitution, but more specifically, there is no "guaran-
tee of certain minimal levels of safety and security, ' ' 34 and "no constitutional
duty to provide substantive services for those within its border." 35 If this means
what it seems to mean-that there is no constitutional right to state protection
against garden variety violence-if, on the facts of DeShaney, a four-year-old
child has no constitutional right to protection against the near-lethal violence
inflicted upon him by a grown man-then it is very hard to see, first, how our
Constitution can be said to echo Lockean or Hobbesian liberalism, but more
specifically, to see how it could be that a woman has a constitutional right to
protection against the usually nonlethal harms occasioned by a fetus. If there is
no constitutional right to be protected by the state against private violence, that
seemingly takes the force out of the constitutional argument that because the
Constitution reflects in a broad way a liberal consensus that there should be
state protection against private assault, and because a nonconsensual pregnancy
can be so characterized, there must be some form of constitutional right to state
assistance in the latter situation.
McDonagh's response is credible, but ultimately I think unconvincing. First
33. See McDONAGH, supra note 1, at 125-54; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 68-93 (manuscript).
34. 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
35. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)).
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of all, she argues, the DeShaney quote is dicta, but more important, the question
she needs resolved was not clearly presented in that case in any event. De-
Shaney, in other words, is not on point. McDonagh's argument is not that there
is a substantive liberty, due process-styled right to the equivalent of a police
force in this situation-the existence of which, she concedes, was denied in
DeShaney-but, rather, that there is a fundamental interest in bodily integrity,
and, therefore, an equal protection-based right to an equal degree of protection
against nonconsensual pregnancies that invade that interest, as exists against
other comparably invasive assaults.36 We do not have a right to a police force,
she concedes. But we do have a right-based on the Equal Protection Clause-to
the same level of protection accorded other similarly situated persons, at least
where such a fundamental interest as the interest in bodily integrity is at stake.
And the only way the state can realistically provide that equal protection is
through state funding of abortion.
Again, just to clarify, McDonagh's argument is not that we have such a right
to state funding of abortion because a suspect class is affected; she acknowl-
edges that Geduldig v. Aiello,3 7 which held that pregnancy does not define a
sex-linked characteristic and hence that the category of pregnant people does
not constitute such a class, notoriously cuts off that line of argument. 38 Rather,
McDonagh argues, we have such a right because the interest being protected-
the interest, here, in bodily integrity-is what the Court has called on past
occasions a "fundamental" right or interest.39 Wherever a fundamental right or
interest is affected by legislation that impacts differently on different groups,
then that legislation must be subject to "strict scrutiny," and it must be so
subjected regardless of whether or not a suspect class is affected. So, whatever
degree or kind or amount of protection is provided to similarly situated persons
against the sorts of invasive assaults on the body most closely analogous to the
invasive assault occasioned by a nonconsensual pregnancy must also be pro-
vided to nonconsensually pregnant women. And, McDonagh concludes, such
protection is considerable. 40 Hence, the state must protect against these assaults,
which again, realistically means simply that the state must fund abortions.
The problem with this response is that to shift the focus from substantive due
process-the constitutional basis for the right at issue in DeShaney itself-to
fundamental interest-equal protection by no means solves the DeShaney prob-
lem. Surely if a woman is entitled to have her fundamental interest in her bodily
integrity protected against the harms brought on by a fetus, then four-year-old
Joshua DeShaney is entitled to have his fundamental interest in his bodily
integrity protected against the near lethal harms brought on by his stepfather.
The "fundamental interest" in bodily integrity revitalized and then relied on in
36. See McDONAGH, supra note 1, at 138-42; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 27-40 (manuscript).
37. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
38. See id. at 496-97.
39. See MCDONAGH, supra note 1, at 142; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 27-32 (manuscript).
40. See McDONAGH, supra note 1, at 143-52; McDonagh, supra note 3, at 32-40 (manuscript).
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McDonagh's argument must extend (at least) to our fundamental interest in
protecting our bodily integrity against all acts of violence that portend death or
serious bodily injury, not just those that are occasioned by fetal life. It is, in
other words, always our fundamental interest in bodily integrity that is threat-
ened by violence. If this fundamental interest-equal protection line of analysis is
right, then the DeShaney dicta is simply wrong, and we do, after all, have a
constitutional right to some level of police protection against violence-or at
least, we all do so long as some of us do. But this head-on collision with the
DeShaney dicta is precisely what the dodge into the fundamental interest-equal
protection line of authority was designed to avoid.
Alternatively, McDonagh could avoid the DeShaney problem by arguing that
Geduldig4' is wrong-that, contra Geduldig, pregnancy is clearly a sex linked
characteristic, and legislation that adversely and intentionally impacts upon
pregnant women must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny. Under such scru-
tiny, the ban on abortion funding for poor women could conceivably fall. Again,
though, McDonagh wants to avoid the burden of arguing the wrongness of
well-established cases. Indeed, much of her book and the bulk of her law review
article are aimed toward showing that precedent and law are clearly on her side.
All the Court needs to do, she insists, is acknowledge the assaultive, invasive
nature of fetal life in a nonconsensual pregnancy for what it is, make the
connections it has thus far failed to make, and overturn only the abortion
funding decisions themselves. It need not overrule, or even seriously reexamine,
anything beyond that. The liberal result here, far reaching and momentous
though it may be, is squarely in line with the Supreme Court's own pronounce-
ments on virtually all related subjects-from liberty, to equality, state action,
and, except for the funding cases, even the abortion cases themselves.
Although McDonagh herself is not a lawyer, this insistence in McDonagh's
work on the happy harmony between the result demanded by a far reaching
liberalism and American turn of the century constitutional doctrine, is a mark of
her indebtedness to liberal legalism-American liberal lawyers routinely as-
sume the convergence of liberal commitments and American constitutional
doctrine. And, again, that insistence is in some ways a strategic or practical
strength of McDonagh's overall approach. If she is right that a recognition of
women's rights to be free of nonconsensual pregnancies would be in line with
the liberal tradition and constitutional doctrine both, then that's obviously
important to know, for it means that the Court would have to do very little to
accommodate such a recognition. But I'm not sure, here, that the flame of not
upsetting the constitutional applecart is worth the candle expended to get there.
To put it crudely, what we gain with this argumentative dance around DeShaney
and Geduldig is basically a very small chance that the Court will accept an
41. Cf Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494 (holding, under rational basis review, that the Equal Protection
Clause does not compel states to classify normal pregnancy and delivery as a "disability" for the
purpose of paying state employee benefits).
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anti-DeShaney holding because it is cast in terms that disguise its true nature.
But this small-chance gain comes at the cost not only of forthrightness, but also
of the consistency of liberalism itself. A Constitution, after all, that provided a
right to protection against private assault but only if the sort of assault re-
sembled one type of attack and not if it resembled another type of attack, and
only if it was within the logic of one line of precedent, but not if it was within
the logic of another, would be decidedly illiberal, as well as irrational. To be
more precise, a Constitution that demanded equal protection of the law for
women whose autonomy and physical integrity is threatened by fetal life within
them, but not for four-year-old boys whose lives are threatened by their parents,
would not be one liberals would or should be inclined to support.
The hard truth-certainly for liberals-is that the Court took a drastically
illiberal turn in DeShaney: to suggest that citizens have no right to state
protection against private violence, and hence that a state could constitutionally
decide for any or no reason to withdraw its police protection from some class of
citizens-say, children, or pregnant women, or poor people-against others,
does as much violence to Lockean and Hobbesian understandings of the liberal
compact as it is possible to imagine. As long as the DeShaney dicta is a good
snapshot view of our constitutional law as envisioned by this court, then our
constitutional law is illiberal. It might be better simply to acknowledge that fact,
than to insist that contrary to the evidence of one's senses a square peg can fit in
a round hole, and for two reasons.
First, simply as a practical or political matter, the cost of acknowledging the
inconsistency between DeShaney and the result McDonagh argues here may not
be as high as first appears: if the dicta from one case, such as DeShaney, or one
line of cases, looks wrong because it is illiberal, such a claim can be incorpo-
rated into a sound liberal-legal argument which might nevertheless be accepted
by the Court. Courts do from time to time overrule themselves or disown prior
dicta. Such could happen here: contrary to the dicta and arguably the holding of
DeShaney, we all could have a right to state protection against private assaultive
invasions, nonconsensual pregnancies could be such assaultive invasions, and
the failure to fund abortions could be accordingly unconstitutional. On the other
hand, of course, the Court might not accept an invitation to overturn or narrow
the DeShaney opinion. But it won't be more inclined to issue a decision that
implicitly does so because the nature of the inconsistency has been obfuscated.
More likely, though, in my view, the inconsistency between McDonagh's
premises and the Court's apparent understanding of constitutional- principles
signals a real and lasting conflict between liberal principles on the one hand and
constitutional law as interpreted by the Court on the other. If that's right, then
liberal legals, who almost by definition have identified liberal political moral
theory with the best and deepest political interpretation of the constraints of
majoritarian processes imposed by the U.S. Constitution, clearly have a di-
lemma: they can continue to support the limits on government imposed by the
Constitution, as interpreted by the Court through the mechanism of judicial
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review, or they can continue to support liberal principles. It seems to me that
while this is an unhappy choice it is also an easy one; principled political and
moral liberals owe their loyalty to liberalism, and not to liberalism as watered
down-or polluted by-illiberal constitutional authority. There are other ways to
secure a more liberal society than by employing an ambiguous constitutional
text to urge a conservative court to police or prod a recalcitrant legislature
toward liberal outcomes. McDonagh's book has already altered the academic
discourse on abortion and may effect a sea change in the fundamental way we
view liberalism in relation to women's lives and bodies as well. If it does, then
she will have achieved a change in the liberal landscape that may be of more
lasting importance than a chance at affecting the language of what could turn
out to be another in a string of hollow Supreme Court victories.
III. LIBERALISM, CONSENT, AND LEGITIMATION
Liberalism rests heavily, and in some versions exclusively, on the moral
significance of consent. Liberal feminist reforms and liberal feminism theory,
particularly in the latter half of this century, have clearly born the mark of this
reliance. To take just one example, the rape reform movement-one of the most
important and surely the most successful of the feminist reform movements of
third wave feminism-has rested squarely on the liberal foundational claim that
the giving of consent justifies an act and the lack of consent marks such an act
as coercive. Consensual sex, according first to feminist rape reformers but now
to conventional wisdom as well, is legally nonproblematic (whatever may be its
moral status), but nonconsensual sex is rape, clean and simple,42 and it is rape
whether or not it is committed against a prostitute, whether or not the victim had
a history of promiscuity, whether or not it is accompanied by acts of violence,
and whether or not the victim fought back. Consent is necessary to the value,
and hence legality, of intercourse, and at least in some jurisdictions the lack of
consent is sufficient to establish the criminality of the intercourse.
To continue for a moment with the example, it is clear that establishing the
harms and eventually the criminality of nonconsensual sex has been a tremen-
dous breakthrough for women. Women in marriage, prostitutes, women with
"promiscuous" sexual histories, women who don't fight back, and women who
are sexually defrauded in nonviolent ways-all of whom were not protected
under traditional rape law-are all, at least nominally and theoretically, now
protected against sexual assault by the criminal law of rape. There are, however,
risks, or costs, in the use of consent as a marker of the line between criminality
and legality, perhaps the greatest of which is what critical legal scholars refer to
as the risk of "legitimation." The risk of legitimation is simply the risk that the
insistence on the criminality of nonconsensual transactions, or events, or distribu-
42. The classic treatment is SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987). I have discussed this liberal
understanding of rape in Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex and Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 233
(1996).
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tions, such as rape, or theft, or slavery, tends to legitimate, or valorize, or in
some other way put beyond the realm of criticism, consensual acts, events, or
distributions, even where unwarranted. Although, as I will try to show in a
moment, there surely is no logical implication, it is a short and unfortunate step
from the insistence on the harmfulness and criminality of a nonconsensual
transaction to the inference that the same distribution, if consensual, must
therefore be good. Thus, the criminality of theft, for example, further legiti-
mates the value, as well as the legality of consensual bargains-hence, com-
merce-as the criminality of slavery further legitimaies the value and legitimacy
of wage labor. Likewise, the criminality of nonconsensual sex tends to legiti-
mate, or valorize, all forms of consensual sex, including those of which we
should be or remain critical. Liberalism, to put the criticism in a nutshell,
properly condemns coercive and nonconsensual political transactions, but it
does so by glossing or trumpeting the value of anything that meets a threshold
of consensuality.
Clearly, as a logical matter, the inference underlying the phenomenon of
legitimation is unwarranted; the wrongness of a nonconsensual transaction,
event, or distribution does not logically imply the goodness, value, rightness, or
justice of a consensual transaction. All that follows from the wrongness of a
nonconsensual, coercive transaction is that if the consensual transaction is
wrong, bad, harmful, or unjust, it is so for reasons other than its nonconsensual-
ity. That slavery is wrong does not imply that wage labor is good, it only means
that if wage labor is wrong, it is so for reasons other than its nonconsensuality.
That theft is wrong (and criminal and harmful) does not imply that consensual
commerce is good, or just, or valuable, it only implies that if a consensual
exchange is unjust, or wrong, it is so for reasons other than its coerciveness. Put
baldly, this is all obvious. It has, however, clearly been a part of the legacy and
residue of traditional liberalism to suggest the contrary. The consensuality of a
transaction, transfer, event, distribution, or social system, in liberal societies,
inexorably comes to be viewed as not only a necessary condition of its justice or
value, but a sufficient condition as well.
This is an unwarranted implication, though, that is widely drawn and that
broadly matters. It is deeply connected, in liberal societies, to the tendency to
conflate legal and ethical, or legal and political norms of value. If consent is
both the marker of legality and illegality, or noncriminality and criminality, and
the marker of value and lack of value, then it follows syllogistically that the
dividing line between criminality and noncriminality, or legality and illegality,
will also be the dividing line between that which is valued and that which is not,
or that which is perceived to be good and that which is not. The bottom line
consequence of that development, in turn, is that our moral vocabulary, and then
our moral discourse, is eviscerated. That which is criminal or illegal is so
because it is nonconsensual, and that which is nonconsensual is bad; that which
is consensual, then, is both legal and good. We become incapable of even
talking about, much less judging, the value, the goodness, or the moral worth of
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that which is legal, and hence, that which is consensual. A risk of liberalism,
then, is that the reliance on consensual ethics that is at its core comes to exhaust
not only our legal universe but our moral universe as well. That which is
consensual comes to be seen as both legal and good--consent comes to be our
moral marker of what we value and should value, as well as our legal marker of
what we criminalize.
This risk of undue legitimation-the unwarranted valorization of consensual
transactions, events, or acts, following upon the condemnation of the nonconsen-
sual transfers effectuating the same result-is hard even to identify within liberal
feminism, much less to come to grips with, partly because of the overriding
liberal assumptions of so much of our contemporary and academic discourse,
but also because of the glaring illiberality of so many of the social and private
institutions that continue to affect adversely so many women's lives. Worry of
the risk of unduly legitimating or valorizing consensual transactions, in other
words, may itself seem unduly precious, or bourgeois, when so many women's
lives are seemingly governed by illiberal measures of force and coercion.
Nevertheless, in liberal societies particularly, we should not lose sight of it.
Women consent to events and transactions and arrangements all the time--day
in and day out-that do us considerable harm: from marriages, to love affairs, to
one-night stands, to unequal pay for comparable work, to sexually harassing
work and school environments, to second shifts in the home, and to mommy
tracks at work. The harm these consensual relations, environments, transactions,
events, acts and transfers occasion becomes increasingly hard to describe, to
quantify, to identify, to name, or to recognize as the language and apparatus of
consent-based ethics overtake our moral as well as legal discursive world.
Feminist reform movements that are themselves grounded in liberalism, and
in the liberal reliance on consensual ethics, then, pose a particular dilemma for
feminism generally: even where those reforms are well worth the risk, by
positing, advocating, and then achieving the criminality of coercive institutions
in women's lives, they risk further legitimating the consensual transactions that
also do women real harm. The rape reform movement is an example. Again, it is
an unquestionable gain for women that courts, state legislatures, and intellectual
and political elites are now convinced that nonconsensual sex is what rape is,
rather than sexual penetration, with force, with someone not one's wife, and
against the will of the victim, so long as she is a stranger, is relatively chaste,
and fights back. But that very accomplishment has arguably made it harder, not
easier, to identify the wrongs done women by consensual sex: the harms done,
for example, by sex-for-money, surrogacy contracts, promiscuous sex, harassing
sex, and (most broadly) sex that is consented to but not desired. In a social
world that equates the legal with the consensual, and the consensual with the
valuable, the harms done by consensual transactions become anomalous.
Eileen McDonagh's emphatic and overdue elucidation of the harms occa-
sioned by nonconsensual pregnancies-and her attempt to marshal the powers
of law to protect women from those harms-is an important breakthrough for
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abortion politics, liberalism, and feminism, but like the rape reform movement
before it (as well as the movement toward contractualizing the entire institution
of marriage), it too, by relying on the nonconsent marker as the trigger for the
apparatus of justice, runs the risk of unduly valorizing or legitimating that
which is consensual-in this case consensual pregnancies. Nonconsensual preg-
nancies are harmful in the ways McDonagh has helpfully elaborated and in
additional ways as well, which I have tried to suggest above. But consensual
pregnancies can also be harmful, and we need to take care not to further obscure
the point by focusing on the harms of nonconsensual ones. An undue reliance
on the ethic of consent runs a serious risk of defining out of existence these
harms, and hence a serious risk of putting these harms both conceptually and
politically beyond the reach of any conceivable political reform.
Let me just briefly elaborate. First, a woman may consent to a pregnancy for
any number of reasons that she nevertheless, to the core of her being, doesn't
want; second, she may have even wanted pregnancies which are profoundly
counter to her best interest. Of course, a woman may have perfectly good-
meaning sufficient-reasons to consent against her own desires, or to desire a
pregnancy that is not in her own best interest. She may become or remain
pregnant even if she does not wish to because she is opposed to both contracep-
tion and abortion for moral or religious reasons. She may want to become
pregnant, or want to remain so, to please her mate, her community, or her
extended family, or she may desire a pregnancy simply because it is expected of
her to desire a pregnancy. Such consensual pregnancies-both wanted and
unwanted-take a toll. Engaging in the work of pregnancy, the expectation and
reality of motherhood that follow, undergoing the physical changes, and giving
oneself over to it, are all transformative experiences. The transformation may be
joyous, and wondrous, and even miraculous, and is experienced as such by
many, many women, but if the pregnancy is unwanted, such an experience is
not likely. Putting one's body in the service of the creation of new life when one
doesn't want to do so is not as harmful as doing so where one has not
consented, but it carries its own costs: it is likely to severely inhibit one's own
possibilities, or, loosely, one's place and impact in the world.
We need to work toward a world in which women are free to terminate
pregnancies to which they do not consent. But we also need to work toward a
world in which women become and remain pregnant only when they truly
desire to do so, and in which they desire to do so only when they truly wish to
create new life. It may well be that law per se has little to contribute to these
latter efforts. But we need, at least, to take care that our legal discourse-its
assumptions, its values, its premises, and its ethics-doesn't make the work of
creating such a world greater than it need be by defining our options in such a
way as to obviate the need for it.
Lastly, we need to be careful not to create a discursive world that throws a
blanket cloak of legitimacy around the institutions that structure consensual,
wanted, and even well advised pregnancies. Such institutions are not all that
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they could or should be, and that we freely consent to them should not place
them beyond the scope of rational critique. Let me illuminate the point with a
more familiar analogy. Consensual wage labor is obviously an ethically superior
system of productive labor than slavery. Yet even consensual, wanted, and well
advised productive employment is not as safe, meaningful, well compensated,
rewarding, or in essence unalienating as it could or should be--or would be in a
world that respected not only autonomy but also the value and importance of
unalienated labor and the right of the laboror to engage in it. Likewise,
consensual pregnancy would without question be a superior system of reproduc-
tion to the blend of coercion, ideology, and choice within which pregnancies are
now undertaken. But as with productive labor, even fully consensual, wanted,
and well advised pregnancies, and the reproductive labor and then the parenting
to which they lead, are not as safe, well compensated, rewarding, or unalienat-
ing as they could or should be--or would be in a world that respected the
relational work of bearing, giving birth to, and raising children. We need to lay
the liberal groundwork for consensuality in our reproductive lives. But we also
need to keep our eye on the larger prize, and that is a world that both
conceptualizes and values the unalienated relational work of pregnancy, child-
birth, and child rearing. We should not, to pursue the metaphor, let our vision of
that prize be clouded by the seductive but limiting claim that so long as our
reproductive or productive lives are consensually undertaken, then all is as it
should be, and that is all we can legitimately demand of a liberal social order.
IV. CONCLUSION: LIBERALISM, ABORTION PRACTICE AND RHETORIC AND AN
ETHIC OF CARE
Let me conclude by taking up a feature of Eileen McDonagh's argument
which is shared with virtually all liberal and liberal feminist arguments for
abortion rights. Liberal and liberal feminist arguments for abortion are blatantly,
and in the minds of some even notoriously, at odds with what has come to be
called an "ethic of care," at least since that ethic has been elaborated by
feminist moral philosophers, developmental psychologists, and lawyers in the
almost twenty years since publication of Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice.43
Killing a fetus-particularly if one regards it as an unborn child-is not a caring
thing to do. Further, the noncontextualized, absolute, liberal right to do so,
supported by analogy, syllogistically and rationally derived from major prem-
ises, destructive of and devoid of reference to relationality, and so seemingly
fatal to the very genesis of the capacious and naturalistic inclination to physi-
cally nurture, and taken with so little empathic regard for fetal interests, is as far
from such an ethic as one could imagine, and likewise as close as one could
possibly be to the form of moral reasoning now so firmly identified in the minds
of many as "Kohlbergian," or "Jakean," or at any rate masculine. The "ethic of
43. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
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care" Gilligan identified in her book, and which has now been embraced by
many feminists as an overlooked (largely because of its identification with
women) kind of moral reasoning, which could be, but to date hasn't been,
applied to legal, political, and constitutional questions, would seemingly incline
us to humanize so as to further care for the fetus, not to humanize it so as to
clarify our constitutional and political right to kill it. It would seemingly incline
us to endorse the connection and identification of the pregnant woman with the
life within her, not to follow through on the implications of the Court's
insistence that the two lives and interests are separate, and hence each in need of
state protection. It would seemingly urge us to acknowledge and valorize, rather
than disclaim and rebut, the woman's natural connection to the fetus, and it
would embrace ethical courses of action and an ethical system premised upon it,
rather than a course of action and ethical system premised upon the woman's
individual and individuated agency, the consequence of which is to sever rather
than honor that connection.
On the other hand, forcing a woman to nurture unborn life when it is against
her will, against her desire, and against her interest to do so, is an almost
paradigmatically illiberal action for a state to take; for all of the reasons Eileen
McDonagh and others have so well identified, it reeks of involuntary enslave-
ment. The woman who does so is living the consequence of that illiberality; she
is subservient, submissive, dominated, exploited, unequal, and possibly dead-
the last being a possibility if she is poor, the pregnancy life threatening, and the
state has refused to come to her assistance in terminating it-all as a direct
result of our illiberal refusal to acknowledge and enforce her rights. The
subservient, dominated, exploited, damaged, or dead woman who is or was
pregnant without her consent and who is minimally forced to give her body over
to a fetus, and maximally forced to sacrifice her very life, and all without any
violation of her rights and without any claim to the state's protection, is as
major a departure from liberalism and liberal legalism's promised "equal
protection of the law" as it is possible to imagine. If we are going to remain true
and nonhypocritical in our liberal political morality, then we are going to have
to acknowledge that the state must grant pregnant women full sovereignty over
their bodies, even when it implies that to exercise that sovereignty, women will
be in the position of uncaringly willing the end of another human life.
Not exclusively, but nevertheless largely because of its apparent implications
for abortion rights, liberal feminists have accordingly been harsh critics of the
ethic of care, and of any political morality that might be built upon it. The ethic
of care, from a liberal perspective, emphasizes and then valorizes precisely the
interrelationships, the dependency, the lack of agency, the identification with
care and nurturance, the relegation to the private sphere, and in short the sex
and gender linked differences that have been used, when an excuse was needed,
to justify the two-century-long project of continuing the subordination of women
even in a liberal society that should seemingly be committed to ending it. Even
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worse, by naturalizing those differences, the ethic threatens to actually endorse
the extension of that subordination into the modem liberal legal era that
otherwise holds tremendous promise for legally challenging it. The commitment
to formal equality, equal liberty, universality, and equal protection, all structural
features of contemporary legal liberalism, all seemingly imply the illegality and
perhaps the unconstitutionality of the patriarchal subordination of women. And
yet, it is precisely the logic of those commitments-to formal equality, equal
liberty, universality, and equal protection-which the logic of an ethic of care
perversely cast in doubt. Eileen McDonagh sees and understands this conflict,
and comes down cleanly on the side of liberalism, both with regard to abortion
politics, and with regard to political theory more generally.
Although a full elucidation of the relation between liberalism and an ethic of
care is well beyond the scope of this essay, I want to suggest in these closing
comments that the apparent opposition between the two of them, although
understandable, suggests the failings of each, and not the failure of one or the
other of them, and the continuing opposition between the two of them is
ultimately in the service of neither. Liberalism needs to incorporate an ethic of
care if it is to be a sound conception of public and private life, and an ethic of
care needs to incorporate constraints of justice informed by a liberal regard for
the dignity of the individual self if it is to constitute a sound basis for private
and public life. Liberal critics of an ethic of care, as well as communitarian and
difference-feminist critics of liberalism, are right to see the antithesis between
the two. But they are wrong to suggest that the consequence of that antithesis is
or should be the annihilation of the other; what we clearly need, both in theory
and in political life, is reconciliation. In part because of the labors of liberal
feminist critics of an ethic of care,an the first half of this equation has become
easy to see, at least in theory if not in practice. The ethic of care, and caring
relations in general, must be consensual to be morally free and hence morally
justifiable, and this is surely as true of the care enacted in a pregnancy as in
other relationships in life. For the relationship between mother and fetus to be a
morally valuable one, and for the nurturance bestowed by the mother upon the
fetus--often at considerable sacrifice-to be morally worthy, it must be a
consensual relationship, and the giving must be by choice. For it to be a
consensual relationship, the woman must have the freedom to terminate the
pregnancy, should she withhold her consent. What I want to insist here is that
correlatively, although it is much less often acknowledged, both liberalism and
the liberal argument for abortion need the ethic of care. Let me first make the
point with respect to liberalism, and then focus on the abortion debate in
particular.
44. Linda McClain's work, some of which is critical of my own use of an ethic of care, has been the
most far-reaching in this regard. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism,
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171 (1992); Linda C. McClain,
"Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 339 (1996).
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First, on the relation of a liberal vision and an ethic of care. As has been
shown and decried by scores of theorists from a range of disciplines, classical
liberalism in its typical incarnation-with its commitment to a clear division
between public and private spheres, full formal equality of citizens, respect for
autonomy and individuality, and a high regard for the chosen life plans of all
citizens-seemingly requires the subordination of women (or some other class)
if the society it governs is going to extend past one generation. The work of
bearing, giving birth to, and raising children (to say nothing of house keeping,
cooking, and sexual servicing) is at "right angles" with the independence,
autonomy, and rational self-regard, the individuating, self-making, market labor
and the equalizing civic and political deliberations held in such high esteem by
liberal theory and liberal institutions. Consequently, if the equal regard for
citizens that liberalism promises is an equal regard for individual, independent,
autonomous, self-regarding, self-chosen, and self-creating adult agents, then it
will have to be noncitizens, or some relatively oppressed or subordinated group
of citizens, who do the communitarian, interdependent, nonautonomous, some-
times chosen and sometimes unchosen, other-regarding, other-creating, and
profoundly nonindividuating work of bearing, caring for, and raising children.
Obviously, liberalism will work most smoothly if that work, done in the private
sphere by nonindividuated, dependent, interdependent, other-regarding, and
other-creating people, is undertaken both cheerfully and ethically-in accor-
dance, say, with an "ethic of care" that constitutes the antithesis of but also the
private complement to liberal values and aspirations, but is nevertheless itself
sufficiently rich to confer meaning and rewards upon the illiberal lives played
out within it-rather than by force or compulsion. Should, though, it come to
pass that women are neither forcibly nor ideologically driven into illiberal
private lives, but welcomed into liberalism's empire, the need for that other-
identified, other-creating, other-regarding, nonindividuating, dependency-
creating work is not going to wither and die. The need for the work still
remains, so long as our liberal utopia aspires to outlast one generation.
How will this need be met, in a liberal society that presumes and honors the
autonomous, individuated, self-regarding, self-creating nature of all citizens,
women and men, mothers and non-mothers, alike? In a liberal capitalist economy
marked by substantial divisions of wealth, of course, wealthy people can simply
contract the work out, creating yet another subordinate, albeit paid, class of
female workers living illiberal private lives within a liberal public world, while
poorer citizens catch-as-catch-can on their own. We are to some degree living
out the illiberality of this path. Alternatively, and more appealingly, we could
recraft liberalism so as to acknowledge, honor, and fully compensate the
relational and interdependent work of childbearing and child rearing. To do so,
though, we will have to fuse an ethic of care, to date so thoroughly identified
with the private world of femaleness, with our sense of "the public" and of
"public citizenship," not use the liberal ethic and the values that accompany it
as a hammer to bludgeon the ethic of care into smithereens. We will have to
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incorporate into the meaning of citizenship a commitment to the care and
nurturance of the young and the weak, and, in general, re-think what it means to
be an individual within a liberal society so as to recognize the degree to which
individual personhood requires dependencies and interdependencies forged with
others. If we are going to do so, we need to enlarge upon, and incorporate into
the public sphere, the ethic of care heretofore conscribed to the private, not
further denigrate it as we celebrate women's participation in the public, liberal
worlds of politics and commerce.
The liberal argument for abortion, particularly if grounded in consent and
liberal consent-based ethics, also needs the ethic of care, and for at least two
reasons. First, without it, it is going to be difficult, and maybe impossible, to
make convincing the claim that liberalism ought to be extended to women's
reproductive lives in the manner urged by McDonagh or by other liberal
theorists. There is no logic, nor is there any power on earth, that can compel this
society or any other to extend the reach of liberalism to include women's lives,
or women's reproductive choices. The logical coherence, as well as the political
structures, of both liberalism and reproduction could be preserved by simply
defining women's lives, or at least women's reproductive lives, as beyond the
reach of liberalism's empire. Recognizing women's rights to consent or not to
consent to pregnancies will ultimately depend, therefore, not on the Supreme
Court accepting an argument that the logic of liberal legalism demands it
(although I think it does), but rather, on making the case that such a recognition
would be a good-and not just the right-thing to do. The case on the merits, so
to speak, requires a showing not just that the logic of liberalism requires such a
right, but also that the world is a better place for its inclusion of such a right.
That, in turn, requires a showing that consensuality improves the quality of
caring and caring work, as well as the quality of the ethic that gives that work
moral meaning and urgency. Proponents of abortion rights, in other words, have
to make clear that this expansion of the empire of consensual ethics is not only
demanded by the logic of liberalism, but also that it will do more good than
harm.
To make such a case obviously depends, minimally, on a showing that
extending liberalism and its promises to women's reproductive lives will not
come at the cost of the ethic of care upon which the survival of the society
depends. Less obviously, but relatedly, I think, it depends on a showing that
such an expansion of liberalism will not only not destroy, but will actually
improve the quality of the ethic of care, as well as the lives of those who depend
upon it. For the liberal argument for women's right to an abortion to be
persuasive, it must be the case that in the liberal consensual utopia the ethic of
care will remain a meaningful and even strengthened ethic, governing relations
between strong and weak, as well as between equals, dependents, and interdepen-
dents. It must remain a meaningful ethical constraint on choice, even when-or
especially when- the relations it governs are grounded in consent rather than
nature, force, or ideological compulsion. Thus, the decision to terminate a
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pregnancy, in a world where the right to do so is absolutely clear, ought to be
made in a way that gives due regard to the interests of the fetus, just as the
decision of the parent of the born child to give or withhold a needed body part
ought to be so made. When such decisions are made recklessly, or negligently,
or unthinkingly, or uncaringly, they ought to be subject to moral condemnation.
Likewise, the decision to conceive, bear, and raise a child, once the consent to
the pregnancy is proffered, ought to be made in an ethical and caring way.
The liberal right to terminate or continue a pregnancy could, I think, vastly
improve, by clarifying, the moral dimensions and hence the moral quality of the
decision to do so. If we have the freedom to do or not to do some act, it
becomes relevant, where it is not otherwise, whether or not we have done so
morally. But the language of liberal rights, recklessly embraced, can also
annihilate the ethical discourse-whether an ethic of care, or any other-that
gives moral deliberation content. If we embrace without qualification the liberal
ethic and language of rights, individualism, consent, or choice, at the cost of all
other constraining ethics, we will lose not just the vocabulary of moral condem-
nation, but the sense of it as well. The ethic of care provides the necessary heart,
content, and language for moral criticism of the legal choices that liberalism
guarantees, in the context of abortion rights no less than elsewhere in the
rights-plowed fields of liberal utopia. For that reason alone, liberalism, and
liberal rights, require the integrity of care.
Finally, liberal advocates of abortion rights need to insist, not just concede,
that in a liberal utopia that includes the nonconditional right to withhold consent
to pregnancy, the ethic of care structures the relationship that is being consented
to when a woman does give her consent to a pregnancy. Both the consensual
relationship between mother and fetus, and the eventual relationship between
mother and child, is a relationship of care, both ideally and in fact, and that
relation of care, even assuming its consensuality, is not well described by the
consensual ethics of neo-classical liberalism, and its participants are not well
protected by liberal political structures, at least as those structures are lived out
in this society. The pregnant woman who consents to the pregnancy does
nevertheless continue through the pregnancy to subordinate her immediate
interests to the fetus, and the parent does so vis-A-vis the child to an even
greater degree. That a woman consents to the relationship makes her a willing
participant, but it does not change that basic fact about it. The parent, once the
child is born, quintessentially is not the autonomous, self-regarding, self-
creating individual envisioned by liberal theory; the parent, quintessentially,
acting as a parent, acts in regard to the child's interests, acts toward the end of
creating the child's identity, and accepts considerable constraints and limitations
on his or her own autonomy by doing so. The incompatibility between the
autonomous individual of liberal theory and the interdependent and dependent
life of a primary caregiver is profound, and although it is substantially lessened,
that incompatibility is by no means obviated by the insistence that the parental
role only be undertaken voluntarily. If we abandon both the language and
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content of an ethic of care-particularly if we do so in order to obtain the right
to terminate a pregnancy-we will lose not only our ability to describe ad-
equately the contours of our caring relations with children and with the others
for whom we care or upon whom we depend for care. We will lose as well our
claim to the injustice of a liberal polity that refuses to recognize, or value, or
even accommodate, its dimensions.
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